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Abstract 
 
Contemporary approaches to varieties to capitalism are often criticized for neglecting issues of 
institutional change.  This paper develops a perspective on institutional change designed to be 
applicable to the equilibrium analyses of such approaches but distinctive relative to competing 
understandings of institutions.  It begins by outlining an approach to institutional stability, which 
suggests that the persistence of institutions depends not only on their aggregate welfare effects 
but on the distributive benefits they provide to underlying social or political coalitions and not 
only on the Pareto-optimal quality of their equilibria but on continuous processes of mobilization 
through which the actors test the limits of existing institutions.  It then develops an analysis of 
institutional change congruent with this starting point, which emphasizes the ways in which 
reform, defection and reinterpretation emerge out of contestation and compares this account of 
institutional dynamics to recent developments in Germany and France.  The paper concludes by 
elaborating the implications of this perspective for analyses of liberalization in contemporary 
political economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparative political economists have become deeply interested in processes of institutional 
change, and especially in those taking place in response to the opening of world markets 
associated with ‘globalization’ (Pierson 2001; Djelic and Quack 2003; Rieger and Leibfried 2003; 
Campbell 2004).  They are asking a number of questions.  When do the institutions of the 
political economy change?  What factors drive change?  Are changes in the international 
economy enforcing institutional convergence on the developed economies? 
 We take up these issues with reference to one of the more influential frameworks devised 
to explain national differences in economic performance and policy, namely the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ perspective now employed by a substantial number of scholars (see Hall and Soskice 
2001).  Building on the literatures of neo-corporatism and the ‘regulation school’, this approach 
applies the new economics of organization to the macroeconomy.  It focuses on firms, as actors 
central to the process of economic adjustment with core competencies that depend on the quality 
of the relations they develop with other actors, including producer groups, employees and other 
firms.  Those relationships depend, in turn, on the institutional support provided for them in the 
political economy as a whole.  Although the perspective acknowledges that these relationships 
can take on a wide range of forms, it emphasizes the distinction between liberal market 
economies, where firms rely heavily on competitive markets to coordinate their endeavors, and 
coordinated market economies, where more endeavors are coordinated strategically.   These 
different modes of coordination are said to confer comparative institutional advantages that 
mediate national responses to globalization.  They rest on institutional complementarities that 
allow arrangements in one sphere of the political economy to enhance the results secured in 
others.  The framework provides distinctive perspectives on many of the issues raised by 
globalization. 
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 However, questions have been raised about the adequacy of the varieties-of-capitalism 
perspective for understanding institutional change.  Some argue that this approach is overly static 
and its distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies outmoded by the 
liberalization of the world’s economies.  Others read into it an overweening functionalism that 
explains institutional change by reference to its macroeconomic effects and suggest the approach 
neglects the social or political dimensions of institutional change.1  These critiques raise 
important issues that go well beyond the Hall and Soskice (2001) volume.  The varieties-of-
capitalism approach offers fresh and intriguing insights into differences among the developed 
economies, but it can hardly be considered viable if it cannot also comprehend processes of 
institutional change.  Many of the criticisms suggest that the equilibrium elements of the new 
economics of organization analysis are inimical to dynamic analysis and that rationalist 
approaches understate the chaotic quality of institutional change or the contribution unintended 
consequences make to it.  These concerns have significance for the analysis of institutional 
change more generally. 
The object of this paper is to address these issues by elaborating an account of 
institutional change more extended than the one provided in Hall and Soskice (2001) but 
congruent with its varieties-of-capitalism perspective. Our claim is that this perspective embodies 
a sophisticated understanding of institutional change that is eminently political and useful for 
analyzing contemporary developments in the developed political economies.  We show that the 
equilibrium aspects of this approach are not incompatible with dynamic views of the political 
economy and why broadly rationalist approaches to the political economy need not imply a 
barren functionalism. 
We proceed by developing a series of propositions about the nature of institutions and the 
sources of institutional stability that we then use to develop contentions about institutional 
change. Our focus is on the institutions of the political economy in the realms of industrial 
relations, corporate governance, vocational training and technology transfer.  Although our 
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principal objective is to outline a theoretical perspective, we provide some preliminary 
substantiation for its propositions with reference to recent developments in Europe and Germany, 
key cases for analysts of change in the political economy.  We conclude by drawing some general 
conclusions about the trajectory of the European economies today. 
 
1. The Institutional Terrain 
In this paper, we conceptualize institutions as a set of regularized practices with a rule-like quality 
in the sense that the actors expect the practices to be observed, and which in some but not all 
cases are supported by formal sanctions.  They can range from regulations backed by the force of 
law or organizational procedure, such as the rules that apply when a worker is laid off, to more 
informal practices that have a conventional character, such as the expectation that firms will offer 
a certain number of apprenticeships.2  In some cases, macro-institutions, such as the ‘vocational 
training system’ are composed of many component rules and practices that are themselves 
institutions. 
 Compared to alternative perspectives, several features of the varieties-of-capitalism 
approach to institutions are distinctive.  As an actor-centered and broadly-rationalist approach, it 
conceptualizes the political economy as a terrain peopled with entrepreneurial actors seeking to 
advance their interests as they construe them, constrained by existing rules and institutions but 
also looking for ways to make institutions work for them. The political economy is replete with a 
multiplicity of institutions, many nested inside others.  Some can serve as functional substitutes 
for other institutions, at least for some purposes.3  Several important implications follow.   
 First, this perspective suggests that institutions are best seen, not as a rigid matrix of 
sanctions and incentives to which actors respond in relatively mechanical fashion, but as 
resources that actors use to attain their ends, in some cases switching from one institution to 
another when it seems more likely to serve their purposes.  Although some institutions rely on 
sanctions for their operation, the varieties-of-capitalism approach moves away from a view of 
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institutions purely as factors that constrain action toward one that sees them also as resources, 
providing opportunities for particular types of action, and especially collective action (see Hall 
1998). 
Second, this perspective implies that institutions are not simply the embodiment of 
strategic action, as some would have it, but can be the target or objects of such action (cf. Calvert 
1995a).  Because they face a multiplicity of institutions, actors sometimes have a choice about 
which institutions to operate within.   Any given strategy adopted by a firm or other actor is also 
likely to be conditioned, not by one, but by a number of institutions.   Because the varieties-of-
capitalism approach emphasizes institutional interaction effects, it argues that firm strategies are 
conditioned simultaneously by multiple institutions, often in different spheres of the political 
economy (Hall and Soskice 2001: 21-36). 
 There are important points of tangency between this perspective and some other well-
known approaches to institutions.  From the ‘logic of appropriateness’ approach favored by some 
new institutionalists, this perspective accepts the point that institutions may sometimes influence 
action because they define behavior seen as appropriate to the endeavor at hand from the 
perspective of a particular cultural worldview (March and Olsen 1989; Dobbin 2000).  From the 
‘institutions as equilibrium’ approach advanced by Calvert (1995a, b) and others, it accepts the 
observation that the stability of a particular pattern of strategic interaction often rests on the 
absence of Pareto-improving alternatives apparent to the actors under current conditions.  
Although often presented as polar opposites, we do not regard these perspectives as mutually 
exclusive in a real world that contains many motives for and patterns of behavior. 
 However, neither of these approaches fully conveys the ‘institutions as resources’ 
element of our perspective and, if carried to extremes, both overstate the degree to which any one 
institution determines action.  To say that an institution specifies patterns of behavior seen as 
appropriate to the culture should not be taken to imply that all or even most in that culture adhere 
slavishly to it.  There is always room, and often reason, to be critical of what is deemed 
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‘appropriate’.  Similarly, although the mutual benefits of strategic interaction may render an 
institution more stable, that observation says only a little about how institutions are sustained, 
because it ignores the omnipresent processes of search and negotiation whereby entrepreneurial 
actors look for alternative ways in which to advance their interests (Knight 1995).  There is more 
intrinsic openness to the institutional arena than these two perspectives imply. 
 
2. Institutional Stability as a Political Problem 
Any analysis of how institutions change should begin from a conception of how institutions are 
sustained during periods when they remain stable.  Why do actors adhere to the regularized 
practices that constitute an institution?   
 The account of the institutional terrain we have just given generates a specific set of 
answers to this question.  Institutionalized behavior may resemble the following of rules, but the 
principal motivation of actors for adhering to regularized practices lies in efforts to advance their 
self-interest as they construe it. Thus, most institutions in the political economy rest, not on 
practices of passive rule-following, but on a more active process in which entrepreneurial actors 
seek to advance their interests, including in contexts of strategic interaction where institutions can 
improve the well-being of those who participate in them by resolving the collective action 
dilemmas they face.  Such a view belies any simple notions of ‘institutional inertia’.   
Moreover, our perspective calls for some revision in the way in which ‘coordination’ is 
construed.  In game-theoretic analyses, ‘coordination’ is often seen as a pattern of behavior that 
arises relatively spontaneously, when the opportunity for it appears among actors who are viewed 
as contractors.4  Coordination is said to follow directly from the presence of supportive 
institutions.  By contrast, from the perspective we are elaborating, the achievement of 
coordination appears as a political problem.  Coordination is not easily secured and rarely follows 
automatically from the presence of certain institutions.  Instead, active support for a specific 
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mode of coordination must be mobilized on a relatively continuous basis from actors who are 
conscious of its limitations as well as its advantages (Thelen 2001). 
 A good deal of the politics surrounding institutional stability flows from the loose 
coupling between self-interest and institutions.  From the broadly rationalist perspective we adopt 
here, the durability of an institution can rest substantially, if rarely wholly, on how well it serves 
the interests of the relevant actors.  Where an institution fails to serve those interests, it becomes 
more fragile and susceptible to defection from its rules.  But the calculation about whether an 
institutional practice serves the actors’ interests is a complex one, dependent on a range of 
considerations.  It entails balancing the multiple interests any single actor has in a potential course 
of action, where time discounts and estimates about the effects of one’s actions matter (Hall 
2005).   
The varieties-of-capitalism perspective draws attention to several factors that can militate 
in favor of the stability of institutions. One of the most important is the presence of institutional 
interaction.  As we have noted, the strategies an actor, such as a firm, follows and the benefits to 
be expected from them are usually conditional on the presence, not of one, but of a number of 
institutions. Many German firms might be more willing to withdraw from the institutions that 
coordinate wage bargaining if they did not also face powerful German unions or operate 
particular types of production regimes.5  Where the benefits of changing one institution are likely 
to be realized only when a substantial number of other institutions are also transformed, that 
institution should be more stable.  Conversely, where there are alternative institutional means 
available for accomplishing a task, a firm’s interests may bind it less tightly to one institution.  
Considerations about how readily alternative institutions can be constructed also 
condition the judgments actors make about whether to adhere to an existing institution.  Because 
institutions are collective constructs, it can be difficult to replace one institution with another.  In 
a few cases, an alternative can be secured by fiat: the Swedish government shifted drivers from 
the left to the right-hand side of the road in one fell swoop.  But, in many instances, as Culpepper 
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(2003) shows, it can be difficult to persuade actors to coordinate on new ways of doing things, 
even when there are reasons to think they might be Pareto-improving.  Before a new institution is 
established, one cannot prove it will deliver benefits and the relevant actors cannot be sure of the 
behavior of others on whom its efficacy may depend.  The presence of such uncertainties is a 
crucial factor underpinning institutional stability (Shepsle 1986). Thus, the availability of meta-
institutions for deliberation and rule-making can be crucial to the stability of existing institutions 
and to the prospects for reform (Hall and Soskice 2001: 10-12).  When the world throws up 
shocks that unsettle the benefits flowing from existing institutions, deliberative forums facilitate 
the re-equilibration of cooperative endeavor, by allowing for ‘diagnosis’, where the problem is to 
agree on the cause-and-effect relations generating the problem and pertinent to the solution, and 
for agreement on ‘distributive justice’ where the problem is to apportion the risks and benefits 
that can flow unequally from cooperation.  
Considerations such as these also draw our attention to the fact that the stability of most 
institutions depends on a relatively thick body of ‘common knowledge’ (Hall and Soskice 2001: 
12-14).   To cooperate, actors must feel confident about how others will behave in the face of 
many contingencies.  That demands a set of shared understandings considerably thicker than the 
thin conceptions of ‘common knowledge’ assumed by many models, and the firmest basis for 
such understanding is prior experience of interaction with each other.  The more extensive that 
experience, the more stable an institution is likely to be.  In short, the stability of institutions does 
not rest on instantaneous calculations about self-interest, but on bodies of experience from which 
important reservoirs of common knowledge are filled. 
 However, if actors are daunted, they are not altogether deterred, by uncertainty.  Actors 
are usually engaged in an ongoing reassessment of both their own scope for action and the 
intentions of those with whom they are interacting. They need to be reassured that existing 
institutions continue to serve their interests and that better alternatives are not available.  While 
some actors probe the outer limits of existing arrangements, others try to defend these institutions 
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by assuring others that they are better than available alternatives.  The result is a politics of 
institutional stability, one of whose features is continuous experimentation, as the relevant actors 
test the bounds of what others will deem acceptable behavior, seek new information about their 
partners, assess the effects of alternative courses of action, and consider how severely defection 
from institutionally-sanctioned patterns of behavior will be punished.  For some actors at some 
times, of course, institutional stability might depend on habit.  But, in the political economy, it 
more often depends on a stream of action that is political in the sense that it entails conflict 
designed to test the limits of cooperative arrangements and mobilization to bring other actors in 
line with those arrangements (Thelen 2001: 73 ff.). 
The history of industrial relations in Germany provides excellent examples (Thelen 1991; 
Streeck 1994; Hall 1994).  For many decades, Germany has had a set of institutionalized practices 
for wage bargaining that are highly coordinated, capable of delivering wage restraint, and 
relatively stable. There is no doubt that the resilience of the system depends partly on the 
satisfaction of key employers and employees with the results it has generated, and a standard 
institutional logic can be adduced to explain why the system generates such returns (Soskice 
1990).  Some see this as a ‘consensual’ system of industrial relations, but on closer inspection it is 
clear that industrial relations in Germany have been anything but smooth or consensual.  Behind 
its wage settlements lies a politics marked by periodic conflict between employers and 
employees, including lockouts and strikes.  Why should a conflictual politics be necessary to 
sustain a system that most participants have seen, over the long run, as one that serves their 
interests?  The answer is revealing about the politics of coordination. 
In brief, the participants could never be certain that the system was serving their interests 
well.  In some instances, unanticipated economic events led to wage settlements more rigorous 
than intended, and the unions struck to recover some of the gains they had expected and to remind 
employers they could be punished if they bargained in bad faith (Kreile 1978).   This case 
demonstrates how important relations of power are to the stability of institutions in the political 
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economy.  Whether Pareto-improving or not, institutions generally distribute benefits unevenly 
and the relevant actors are interested in improving their share of them (Scharpf 1997). 
Employers’ federations and unions mounted periodic lockouts or strikes to test the power or 
resolve of the other side and to reassure their own rank and file that they were doing their utmost 
on their behalf.  Thus, one of the factors drawing German unions and employers back toward the 
institutions developed for wage coordination has been a lively perception on each side, 
periodically tested, that they have much to lose from failing to coordinate.   
Moreover, if power relations in a cooperative context are based on the relative 
opportunity costs to each side of failing to cooperate, as Knight (1992) has argued, those costs 
usually depend heavily on the other institutional practices in which the actors are imbricated.  
When deciding whether to bargain cooperative with the unions, employers were influenced by 
other institutions impinging on their interests, such as the works councils they faced, the work 
practices and production regimes they had evolved, and a range of institutions affecting the costs 
a prolonged strike or lock-out would impose on them.  The general point is that institutions do not 
simply resolve collective action dilemmas: they reflect and contribute to the balance of power 
found in many parts of the political economy (see also Moe 2005). 
This conception of the politics of stability speaks to one of the principal criticisms leveled 
at the varieties-of-capitalism perspective, namely, that it adopts an overly functionalist approach 
to the problem of institutional change (cf. Crouch 2005, Streeck 2005).  We can see precisely just 
what it borrows from functionalist approaches and where it rejects them.  As we have noted, this 
perspective shares the functionalist premise that the support groups provide for an institution is 
motivated, to some extent, by the benefits the institution provides, closely linked to the functions 
it performs.  However, our perspective differs from functionalist accounts in two key respects.   
First, we do not assume that support for an institution derives primarily from the 
contribution it makes to aggregate economic welfare.  Varieties-of-capitalism analysts devote a 
good deal of attention to explaining how the institutions of the political economy contribute to 
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national well-being.  But they do not generally claim that the existence of an institution depends 
on that contribution.  Institutional politics as we understand it turns, not on issues of aggregate 
welfare, but on the actions of self-interested actors seeking better outcomes for themselves or the 
groups they represent (Hall and Soskice 2001: 57-8).6 
Second, in contrast to some types of functionalist analysis, we think it dangerous to 
assume that the institutions of the political economy were originally created to serve the interests 
they advance at much later periods of time.  German employers, for instance, expressed 
vociferous opposition to the legislation of the 1950s that enhanced labor’s rights on the shop floor 
(Höpner 2003).  However, once those institutions were in place, employers organized production 
strategies and a range of ancillary practices around them, aiming at high-priced, high quality 
production (Streeck 1992).  As a result, they now overwhelmingly support works councils, 
because their market and production strategies rely on them.  In this as in many other such cases, 
the institutions of the political economy are instruments that actors gradually adapt to their 
purposes and in which many become invested only after they have accommodated their practices 
to them (Thelen 2004).7  Thus, the current effects of an institution help explain contemporary 
support for it, but only rarely can those effects explain the origins of an institution.  
 In sum, although some see the varieties-of-capitalism approach as insufficiently political 
because it focuses on the ways firms coordinate their endeavors, construed in equilibrium terms, 
it deploys an understanding of institutions that anticipates a lively politics, marked by 
experimentation, negotiation and conflict, even in cases of institutional stability.  As Thelen 
(2001) argued, this approach has always rejected the notion that institutions are automatically 
stable, even when they are Pareto-improving, and it associates important political dynamics with 
the maintenance of equilibrium outcomes.    
  
3. Institutional Change in the Political Economy 
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Our understanding of institutional change follows directly from the perspective on institutional 
stability just outlined.   Because political economies are full of entrepreneurial actors interested in 
improving their position, existing institutions are bound to come under pressure.  Institutional 
equilibria can change, as developments shift the material situation, power and self-understandings 
of the actors.  Thus, Hall and Soskice (2001: 54) argued that institutional change will be a regular 
feature of both liberal and coordinated market economies.  The key issues are: when can we 
expect change, how will it occur, and with what kinds of results?  
 
Multiple Agents of Adjustment 
One of the notable features of this approach is its insistence that there are multiple agents of 
adjustment in the political economy.  Globalization is often presented as a contest between states 
and market forces (cf. Cable 1995), and there is no denying that the decisions governments take 
in response to international challenges play a key role in the institutional development of the 
political economy.  In such contexts, as Streeck (2004) has observed, governments come closest 
to being architectonic actors.  On the regulations they promulgate, many other institutions 
depend.  However, the varieties-of-capitalism perspective insists that firms can be equally 
important agents of national adjustment.  They cannot always construct new collective 
institutions without help from governments, but shifts in firm strategy can erode the viability of 
some institutions and make others more important.  Moreover, firms are more sensitive than 
governments to shifts in the economy, because their survival is at stake.  A good deal of the 
process of institutional adjustment in the developed economies can be understood as a pas de 
deux between firms and governments, in which each responds to different pressures but has to 
cope with the moves made by the other side.   
 Recent analyses by Culpepper (2006) and O’Sullivan (2005) of changes in the structure 
of French financial markets are revealing.  Although those shifts began with government 
initiatives to privatize national enterprise and expand the ambit of French equity markets, the 
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traditional networks binding French business to the state were unwound only when key firms took 
the initiative to dissolve their core shareholdings in the newly-privatized enterprises and to seek 
foreign acquisitions and investors.  Much of the impetus for their strategies derived from the 
opening of international markets made possible by agreements the French governments signed, 
but those strategies were driven by new market pressures and opportunities.  Many large French 
firms realized they would prosper only if they secured global market share, and higher stock 
prices became a major asset in the stock swaps used to secure new acquisitions.  Thus, French 
companies undertook a series of measures to solidify their market position, and the government 
obliged with congenial regulatory reforms in the sphere of corporate governance (Tiberghien 
2002). 
Similar developments can be observed in the German political economy, where more 
open global markets put pressure on large German firms, especially in the financial, 
pharmaceutical and automotive sectors, to internationalize their operations and to seek a 
favorable regulatory environment in which to do so.  Shifts in firm strategy lay behind 
government initiatives that made it easier for large firms to wind down their domestic 
shareholdings in order to amass capital for foreign expansion.  In short, governments do not have 
the luxury of responding to international economic developments on a tabula rasa.  In many 
cases, they have to react to corporate strategies that are shifting even more rapidly in response to 
those developments.  Changes in rules often follow the accumulation of “deviant” behavior, in 
effect to bring formal rules or legal regimes back into alignment with behavior (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, 15-16). 
As Evans (2005) reminds us, organized producer groups also have a role to play in this 
dynamic, especially where they are important vehicles for inter-firm coordination.  Typically, 
their institutional practices come under pressure as firms shift strategies in response to new 
domestic or international opportunities.  Those shifts can open up new cleavages between 
enterprises of different types – often between large firms with an international orientation and 
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smaller companies oriented to domestic markets – forcing producer groups to devise new means 
to retain the loyalty of their members and new modes of coordinating the endeavors for which 
they were once responsible. As recent developments in Germany and elsewhere suggest, this is a 
task at which they may or may not succeed. 
In short, although the role of states should not be underestimated, institutional change in 
the political economy is driven by the shifting strategies of several sets of important actors, each 
acting out of different sets of interests.8 
 
The Impetus for Institutional Change 
There is no doubt that developments in the international political economy are important stimuli 
for contemporary institutional change.  Among the OECD countries, these developments include: 
the growing weight of the service sector in employment and falling barriers to trade or 
communication that intensify international competition and open up opportunities for sales or 
production elsewhere in the world.  The liberalizing initiatives of the European Union, the 
collapse of Communism, and the reunification of Germany have been of special importance to 
Europe. These developments have shifted the opportunity structures and returns to existing 
institutions for many firms and workers, inspiring institutional ferment in Europe, and some 
analyses treat the problem of institutional change as if the impetus were invariably exogenous to 
the institutions themselves (cf. Frieden and Rogowski 1996).   
As other scholars have begun to point out, however, many institutional changes in the 
political economies of Europe have been inspired by unanticipated effects flowing from existing 
institutions (Thelen 2004, Thelen and van Wijnbergen 2004, Greif and Laitin 2005).  The case of 
solidaristic wage bargaining in Sweden is a well-known example.  In the 1930s, Swedish 
employers pressed for centralized bargaining arrangements in order to link wages in the sheltered 
sectors to those bargained for the export sectors.  But they did not anticipate that centralized 
bargaining would also become a vehicle for compressing differentials between the wages of 
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skilled and unskilled workers.  Over time, centralized bargaining strengthened the position of 
unskilled workers, whose interests could be pooled across all industries in a way that had not 
been possible under sectoral bargaining, and became the vehicle for political exchange with a 
strong social democratic government.  As Sweden’s unskilled workers used their strength to 
narrow differentials with skilled workers, however, they undermined the capacity of employers to 
recruit and deploy skilled labor. By the 1980s, concerns about this issue were grave enough to 
lead the export sectors to pull out of centralized bargaining arrangements, thereby modifying the 
institution they had originally created.  
We see a similar dynamic of endogenously generated change in the German economy, 
where firms took advantage of early retirement policies to resolve structural crises in declining 
industries, such as coal and steel, during the 1950s and 1960s in unanticipated ways that fuelled 
increases in non-wage labor costs (Trampusch 2005). Although effective at facilitating orderly 
workforce reductions in the 1980s and 1990s, these retirement practices had a deadening effect on 
job creation and imposed heavy burdens on social insurance funds. The effect was to spark, not 
only revisions to the early retirement regime, but broader pressures for labor market reform.  
In short, the history of change in the European political economies should not be written 
as if it were entirely a series of responses to external shocks.  The challenge facing analysts is to 
see it as a process partly endogenous to the character of the institutions developed in each nation 
and driven by the unintended consequences that flow from those institutions. 
 
4. Three Routes to Institutional Change 
Many analysts of institutional change focus their attention on major legislative initiatives, such as 
Margaret Thatcher’s reforms to industrial relations or Gerhard Schröder’s reform of corporate 
taxation, marquee events of undeniable importance.  However, the framework we have outlined 
suggests there are at least three routes to institutional change in the political economy, each with a 
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distinctive dynamic.  Beyond explicit reform, which is widely theorized in the literature, we find 
also significant change through what we call processes of defection and reinterpretation.9 
 
Reform 
Of course, the most visible route to institutional change is through processes of reform, which we 
define as institutional change explicitly mandated or endorsed by governments.  We see 
institutional reform, first and foremost, as a process built on coalitional politics.  The principal 
challenge facing analysts is to identify the coalitions of social or political actors that provide the 
support for a change in regulations or policy regimes and the factors motivating their support. 
 The implication of this analysis is that institutional reform often originates in political 
compromises among actors, whether producer groups or political parties, diversely motivated in 
contexts of distributive conflict (Palier 2005).  Thus, there are no guarantees that the process of 
institutional reform will advance national well-being.   If firms decide to support the regulatory 
regimes that sustain the comparative institutional advantages of the nation, it is because they also 
underpin the competitive advantages of the firm.  Behind many reform debates lie other conflicts 
of interest, such as those that habitually divide capital and labor and, on each side, different types 
of firms and workers.  Institutional change is a process of continuous mutual adjustment inflected 
by distributive concerns. 
 However, the varieties-of-capitalism perspective reminds us that the alignments central to 
these conflicts can be deeply influenced by the character of existing institutions.  Firms and other 
actors do not judge proposals for reform as if the new institutions will operate on a blank slate but 
from the perspective of how they will interact with existing institutions in other spheres of the 
political economy.  Actors’ assessments of whether a new set of institutions will benefit them 
often turn on how well those institutions fit with strategies into which they have been drawn by 
virtue of the presence of supportive institutions elsewhere in the economy.  Institutional 
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arrangements in one sphere can condition the positions actors take on institutional reform in 
another sphere. 
 Swenson’s (2001) comparison of pension politics in Sweden and the U.S. provides a nice 
example of this dynamic.  He shows how institutions developed in the arena of industrial relations 
during the 1930s conditioned the types of pension policies employers were willing to support in 
the 1950s.  Because Sweden’s centralized bargaining system created wage floors and kept wage 
competition in check, it inspired new forms of competition for skilled workers based on the 
provision of company pensions.  Given the rising costs of the latter under conditions of full 
employment, employers were willing to support a social democratic initiative to institute 
generous public pensions.  By contrast, the Wagner Act of 1935 left wage bargaining at the 
company level in the United States, fostering a division between low-skill firms operating with 
low non-wage costs and high-skill firms that used using generous company pensions to attract 
skilled labor.  Each had interests in the existing pension regime, and there was no broad business 
constituency for generous public pensions in the U.S.. 
 Goyer’s (2005, 2006) comparison of reforms to corporate governance in France and 
Germany identifies a similar dynamic.  In response to international economic developments, both 
nations made some such reforms.  But the character of the reforms firms were willing to support 
in the sphere of corporate governance was influenced by the character of institutional 
arrangements in the sphere of labor relations.  Many French firms were willing to accept 
measures that made hostile takeovers more feasible and corporate restructuring to raise share 
prices more urgent because they faced weak works councils and trade unions in the industrial 
relations arena.  They knew the opponents of restructuring would be weak and management’s 
room for maneuver substantial.  In Germany, by contrast, where powerful works councils and 
trade unions were institutionally entrenched, firms were receptive to the adoption of international 
accounting standards and measures to strengthen the position of minority shareholders, but 
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resisted efforts to expose them to hostile takeovers, because industrial relations institutions made 
it more difficult for them to restructure quickly in response to demands for ‘shareholder value’.    
 
Defection 
We borrow the term ‘defection’ from game theory, where it refers to strategies that deviate from 
the behaviors associated with a cooperative outcome, and use it for cases in which actors who 
have been following the practices prescribed by an institution stop doing so.  Where the 
institution is associated with a formal organization, such as a trade union or employers 
association, the actors may also drop their membership in it.  Although less eye-catching than 
legislative reform, this is an important avenue toward institutional change in the political 
economy. 
 Recent developments in the German metalworking sector provide a good example (see 
Kume and Thelen 1999; Thelen 2000).  Over the 1970s and 1980s, many large German firms in 
metalworking took advantage of new opportunities to extend their supply chains and revamp 
production processes.  Those changes made them more efficient but more vulnerable to 
disruptions in production.  Therefore, these firms developed strong interests in labor peace and 
were able to offer skilled workers higher wages and more generous benefits in return for it.  
Lacking the scale to shift production in this way, however, many smaller firms, later including 
some in East Germany, still had to restrain wages in order to remain competitive.  As a result, a 
cleavage opened up between firms in the sector with respect to the appropriate strategy to take in 
collective bargaining rounds. 
 Metalworking exemplifies the institutionalization of coordinated wage bargaining in 
Germany.  Negotiations are conducted at the sectoral level between IG Metall and Gesamtmetall, 
two of the nation’s most powerful producer groups, and they worked well because Gesamtmetall 
managed to retain the support of most firms in the sector.  To do so, it bargained hard, seeking 
modest settlements so as to hold down the wage bill for smaller firms, at the cost of mounting 
 17
lockouts to remind IG Metall of its resolve.  When the most advanced firms in the sector 
developed new supply chains whose effectiveness depended on uninterrupted production, 
however, they developed an aversion to lockouts, and Gesamtmetall began to agree to wage and 
working time settlements higher than some firms could afford.  Smaller firms in particular began 
to defect from Gesamtmetall, either dropping their membership or finding ways to avoid paying 
the wage rates it negotiated.  Through a process of defection, the institutions governing wage 
coordination in the metalworking sector are being transformed.  Similar processes of defection 
are shifting institutional practices in some other spheres of the German and European political 
economies.   
 
Reinterpretation 
A further route to institutional change from below lies in what we call ‘reinterpretation’.  In these 
instances, the actors associated with an institution gradually change their interpretation of its 
rules, and thus its practices, without defecting from or dismantling the institution itself. In some 
cases, that entails the reinterpretation of a legal or regulatory regime, for example through the 
courts.  In others, it involves the gradual acceptance of practices that would not formerly have 
been seen as congruent with the continued existence of the institution. In comparison to ‘reforms’ 
that formally revise or abolish an institution, the process of reinterpretation shifts existing 
practices in piecemeal fashion from below (Aoki 2001, Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
 Recent developments in German collective bargaining display many examples of 
reinterpretation, as employers and workers attempt to bend existing practices to suit their 
interests, without formally abolishing them.  A good example lies in skirmishes over the meaning 
of a core provision in German labor law known as the ‘favorability principle’ 
(Günstigkeitsprinzip) (Rehder 2004).  That principle stipulates that certain issues normally 
reserved for collective bargaining at the industry level can be decided at the local level, in 
bargaining between works councils and individual employers, provided that the outcome operates 
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“to the advantage of the worker”.  Thus, firms can pay wages in excess of the industry rate, but 
they cannot demand concession bargaining.  In recent years, however, employers began to try to 
take advantage of an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘favorability’ (Günstigkeit) to justify local 
employment pacts that offer workers greater job security in return for lower wages.  Their 
argument was that anything offering greater job security in a context of high unemployment 
operates “in favor of the worker” (“zu Gunsten des Arbeitnehmers)”. 
  Although that particular practice has so far been deemed illegal by the courts, these sorts 
of efforts to reinterpret the rules that enshrine a particular division of labor in collective 
bargaining have been a regular feature of German industrial relations. In 1984, for instance, new 
space was opened up for plant-level agreements on working time,  and other agreements have 
continued to expand the scope for work council bargaining on a range of other issues (Thelen 
1991; Hassel and Williamson 2004).  Overall, a significant flexibilization of the German 
bargaining system has been accomplished without a noisy rewriting of the formal rules, through 
successive (and successively expansive) interpretations of the scope for bargaining at the local 
level in response to the market conditions faced by individual firms.  These are cases in which the 
‘rules’ conventionally associated with an institution are reinterpreted, often informally, to 
accommodate new diversities in the interests of the actors associated with it.   
 Processes such as these can act as shock absorbers in the face of new economic 
developments, reflecting an elasticity in the institutions of the political economy that analysis 
focused on formal rules sometimes misses.  However, our point in the present context is to 
emphasize reinterpretation as a mode of change.  Opponents of a given institution may prefer to 
seek change through reinterpretation of existing rules, especially if (as is often the case) this 
avenue poses fewer obstacles than they might confront if they were to launch a frontal assault on 
the formal arrangements.  Among other things, this type of change can often be sought more 
quietly, for example through the courts, avoiding noisy public legislative battles that are sure to 
mobilize the opposition and may even alert more distant stakeholders of interests they did not 
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realize they had but for which they can exact concessions.10  Moreover, and especially to the 
extent that such reinterpretations can be sold as a way to “fix” problems with existing 
arrangements, they also offer more opportunities to forge coalitions with an institution’s 
supporters (Palier 2005).  The latter may resist an institution’s dismantling but be more than 
happy to cooperate in “clarifying” rules or institutions in novel ways, particularly if failure to act 
would bring defections and de facto institutional erosion  In short, these forms of elasticity may 
be important to the survival of strategic coordination, even though they also often entail important 
changes in the functions the institutions perform and the substantive outcomes with which they 
are associated. 
 
5. The Implications for Varieties of Capitalism  
What does this analysis imply about the survival of distinctive varieties of capitalism in Europe 
and about the trajectories of change in its political economies?  The magnitude of the challenges 
facing those economies should not be minimized.  Europe’s largest economies suffer from low 
rates of growth and high levels of unemployment.  Aging populations burden many welfare 
states, and the rise of the service sector has called into question economic models attuned to the 
demands of industrial capitalism (Iversen and Wren 1998).  In such contexts, there is bound to be 
institutional change. 
 
Beyond Liberalization 
However, the terms of contemporary debate about institutional change are manifestly inadequate.  
Most analyses ask whether the developed economies are ‘liberalizing’ and subsume under that 
label a very wide spectrum of initiatives, ranging from efforts to decentralize collective 
bargaining, neutralize unions, dismantle tripartism, privatize industry, cut back social benefits, 
reduce employment protection, promote equity investments, encourage part-time employment, 
and lower minimum wages.  Many of these measures reinforce the role of markets in the 
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allocation of resources.  But, if we are interested in the impact of institutional reform, the 
crudeness of this category obscures more than it clarifies.   It suffers from three prominent 
defects. 
First, liberalization is a multidimensional process.  The types of initiatives we have just 
listed need not accompany one another and often they do not.  Denmark has made major cuts to 
unemployment benefits even as it has shored up tripartism and strengthened unions.  France has 
encouraged part-time work without cutting its minimum wage.  To what extent these measures 
tend to occur together should be an object of inquiry but, for that kind of inquiry to be possible, 
we need to disaggregate the concept of ‘liberalization’ and explore each of its dimensions. 
Second, even measures to ‘liberalize’ a single sphere of the political economy do not all 
have the same effects.  Consider the reform of corporate governance.  Steps to protect minority 
shareholders, to encourage international accounting standards, to promote independent directors, 
to unwind cross-shareholdings, and to allow hostile mergers and acquisitions, among others, are 
all often described as elements of a single ‘liberalization’ process.  But the impact of each of 
these measures is quite different.  Consider their impact on ‘coordinated market economies’ (Hall 
and Soskice 2001).  Some analysts seem to assume that any step in this direction will 
substantially enhance the power of shareholders vis-à-vis stakeholders and corrode the potential 
for strategic coordination in such economies.  However, we see few reasons why the adoption of 
international accounting standards, independent directors and better protection for minority 
shareholders should have a major impact on corporate strategies or damage the corporate 
networks that condition the provision of capital in such nations, let alone dictate changes in labor 
relations.  Conversely, if hostile takeovers were to become a prominent feature of such 
economies, investors would have a way to enforce their concerns about ‘shareholder value’ on 
managers, who might be impelled to unwind some of the cooperative arrangements with other 
stakeholders on which modes of strategic coordination depend.  To treat all of these measures as 
part of a single process of ‘liberalization’ inadvertently disguises differences in their impact.  
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Third, if our analysis is correct, the impact of any institutional reform on the operation of 
the political economy should be dependent on the structure of other institutional arrangements in 
that economy.  There is evidence, for instance, that the economic effects of reforms to corporate 
governance depend on the character of labor relations in the country at hand (Hall and Gingerich 
2004).  A number of studies have suggested that the impact of making the central bank more 
independent of political control will depend on the character of the nation’s wage bargaining 
(Iversen 1999; Hall and Franzese 1998).  Even when a comparative analysis focuses on identical 
institutional reforms, to assume they will have identical effects in all nations is misleading.  
Because of institutional interaction effects, the impact of reform may vary dramatically across 
nations. 
Without denying that the concept of ‘liberalization’ has an important political reality that 
derives from its association with the ‘move to the market’ begun in the era of Reagan and 
Thatcher, we question its value as an instrument for diagnosing the impact of institutional reform 
or for predicting the direction of the developed political economies.  Britain and Sweden both 
experienced what can be called significant “liberalization” in the industrial relations arena during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Wallerstein and Golden 1997).  But liberalization in Britain was associated 
with the demise of unions and employers associations, substantially reducing some kinds of 
coordinating capacities.  In Sweden, by contrast, liberalization involved a movement away from 
national-level wage coordination but also a cross-class realignment that brought much closer 
coordination between blue and white collar bargaining within the export sector, while leaving the 
public sector to bargain separately (Thelen and Kume 2005).  Not all changes grouped together 
under the banner of liberalization produce meaningful ‘convergence’ between coordinated and 
liberal market economies.  To make sense of such developments, “liberalization” is too blunt a 
tool; we need alternative categories with which to secure more fine-grained assessments of the 
impact of institutional change.   
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 In fact, the framing of debates on change in terms of an undifferentiated view of 
“liberalization” squanders one of the greatest advances offered by the varieties-of-capitalism 
framework over its precursors.  The traditional corporatist literature of the 1970s was built around 
the practice of arraying countries along a single continuum, and differences between them (i.e., 
between “more” versus “less” corporatism) were seen as differences in degree (Thelen 1994).  By 
contrast, the varieties-of-capitalism framework recast the debate by organizing the analysis of 
political economies around ideal-typical models that operate according to wholly different logics 
– the differences among them, in other words, are in kind and not in degree.  The current debate, 
which centers on the extent of liberalization effectively re-situates countries on a single 
continuum and reduces the question of change to movement along that continuum.   
 By now an impressive body of research has accumulated that demonstrates that, even 
after two decades of liberalization, a substantial gap remains between the coordinated and liberal 
market economies (Hall and Gingerich 2004: Table 8).  Despite increases in part-time and/or 
temporary employment, and reductions in unemployment benefits, employment protection and 
union membership, still the most generous welfare states remain the most generous (Garfinkel et 
al., 2007).  Countries where firms have traditionally relied on specific, as opposed to general, 
skills, they continue to do so (Campbell et al, 2006; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001).  Although wages 
are now rarely coordinated at the peak level and sectoral wage coordination is looser than twenty 
years ago, there is still extensive wage coordination in coordinated market economies (Hassel and 
Williamson 2004).  More dramatic changes are visible in the areas of corporate governance and 
finance, though even there moves in the direction of pure liberalization have provoked resistance 
(Callaghan 2004; Guillen 2000).   
 
The Nature and Direction of Change 
The observation that contemporary changes have not erased (and are unlikely to erase) the core 
distinction between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies does not imply 
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that the changes currently underway are insignificant.  It merely points to the need to build out 
from the core categories around which the varieties-of-capitalism framework is organized in ways 
that improve on accounts of change based on the alternative liberalization continuum.   
 As a first step, we need to distinguish between specific sets of institutional arrangements 
present in a sphere of the political economy and the types of coordination they sustain.  The 
distinctions drawn by Hall and Soskice (2001) emphasize the extent to which a nation’s 
institutions support, and its firms make use of, market-oriented versus strategic modes of 
coordination.  Whether each type of coordination is sustained in a realm of the political economy 
is analytically separable, however, from the issue of which set of institutional arrangements are 
maintained there.  Critics of varieties of capitalism sometimes view any changes in formal 
institutions as a sign of change in coordinating capacities.  However, consistent with the more 
dynamic view of institutional stability outlined above, we know that formal institutions persist 
only when they are actively adapted to changes in the political and market context.  This means 
that significant revisions in existing formal arrangements may not only be consistent with 
continued coordination, they are often necessary to sustain such coordination.  For example, 
Thelen (2004) traces changes in many of the formal institutional arrangements underpinning the 
German skills system, that, far from undermining the type of coordination on which the German 
high-skill equilibrium is based, were crucial to its survival in the face of successive shifts in the 
economic and political environment over the course of the twentieth century.   
Conversely, however, formal institutional stability is no guarantee of continued 
coordination.  As noted above, many of the formal features of the German industrial relations 
system have proved resilient over the past decade.  Yet processes of defection and reinterpretation 
have resulted in very significant erosion in the scope and functioning of bargaining.  Among other 
things, the devolution of new powers to local labor representatives have reduced the ambit of 
such coordination and reoriented it around the interests of large firms and their core workforces.  
Analogous developments can be found in other political economies.   
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From a varieties-of-capitalism perspective, then, one of the key analytic challenges is to 
distinguish cases in which the effects of institutional reform are to supplant strategic with market 
coordination from cases in which strategic coordination is sustained on a different institutional 
basis.  The demise of unions and employer associations in Britain in the Thatcher years is in this 
sense a very different phenomenon than the flexibilization of industry level contacts in Germany.  
At one level up, one can also ask whether contemporary institutional changes erode irreversibly 
the capacity for strategic coordination, or leave such capacities sufficiently intact that they can be 
recovered later.  The kinds of coordinating capacities that exist in countries like Germany and 
Sweden emerged out of complex historical processes , and they can certainly be lost amidst the 
politics of the present.  Precisely because many contemporary changes in coordinated market 
economies take the form of renegotiations, rather than breakdowns, however, nuanced analysis is 
required to establish whether they have eroded ongoing capacities for strategic coordination. 
Second, and related to this, the breadth of the categories of ‘market’ and ‘strategic’ 
coordination, can mask important changes in the quality of the equilibriums secured under each 
modality.  This suggests the need to build out from the core dichotomy on which the original 
varieties of capitalism framework rests to develop more nuanced analyses of what might be 
described as non-trivial movement within the broad categories of ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ 
market economies.  In Germany for example, evidence from a number of realms, from industrial 
relations, to vocational education and training, to welfare state reforms point strongly not so much 
to a shift in the system toward the Anglo Saxon model, but rather to new forms of dualism and 
labor market segmentation – features that in the past have been more closely associated with an 
alternative “segmentalist” version of coordination, as featured for example in Japan.  The 
narrowing of collective bargaining coverage, the closure of internal labor markets especially in 
large companies, the trend toward more enterprise-oriented modes of in-plant training, and 
welfare state reforms that sharpen the divide between labor market insiders and outsiders all 
represent significant changes with enormous distributional consequences (Thelen and Busemeyer 
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2007).  The systemic features of the varieties-of-capitalism framework provide a crucial tool for 
understanding the timing and direction of change across these various institutional realms, and 
lend insight into the coexistence of looser coordination at the national-political level and 
heightened coordination and cooperation between labor and capital at other levels (e.g., between 
works councils and employers in the large firm sector).  These changes are not well captured on a 
simple liberalization continuum, though it is also clear that analyzing their causes and 
consequences will require further development of more differentiated categories than the simple 
but powerful dichotomy between strategic and market coordination. 
In developing such categories, our perspective suggests promise in distinctions based on 
variation in the political coalitions that support the institutional arrangements underpinning each 
type of coordination.  Influenced by the varieties-of-capitalism perspective, an emerging literature 
in comparative political economy is beginning to link institutional analysis to coalitional analysis 
(Iversen and Soskice 2007, Gourevitch and Shinn 2005x, Thelen, 2004, Mares 2003, Huber and 
Stephens 2001, Swenson 2002).  Much of it traces the genesis of important institutional 
configurations to specific sets of coalitions, formed either among producer groups or within the 
electoral arena.  Many of the relevant political configurations are cross-class coalitions.11    
A related series of analyses explains changes in the form or function of institutions over 
time by reference to shifts in coalitional patterns that alter the political foundations on which they 
rest (Iversen 1996, Thelen and Kume 2005, Martin and Thelen 2007).  These analyses suggest 
that important distinctions among liberal and coordinated market economies, bearing on the 
resilience of coordination there and especially on the distribution of its benefits, can be based on 
variation in the sources of political support for the types of coordination they display (see also 
Pontusson 2005).  Such studies have also begun to uncover the sources of resiliency in more 
solidaristic forms of coordination, even as they provide insights into the drift in other countries 
toward more decentralized, segmentalist forms (e.g., Martin and Thelen 2007). In sum, the kind 
of coalitional analysis that has been so important in explaining the origins of many of the key 
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institutions that anchor coordination in coordinated market economies (e.g., Swenson 2001, 
Mares 2001, Thelen 2004) also provide the basis for a dynamic account of how shifts in interests 
and alignments bring about important reconfigurations of traditional institutions and forms of 
coordination in both liberal and coordinated market economies. 
Not all forms of change, however, amount to renegotiations of coordination; it is 
certainly possible for some forms of strategic coordination to give way to the market.  The ‘mixed 
market economies’ of southern Europe thus provide another set of cases against which the 
perspective on change introduced here can be assessed (Hall and Gingerich 2004).  Historically, 
they have been characterized by high levels of strategic coordination in the spheres of corporate 
governance and labor relations, but coordination secured largely by the actions of relatively-
interventionist states (Schmidt 2002).  Therefore, they are hard cases for our proposition that 
institutional change is led as often ‘from below’ as ‘from above’. 
France is the paradigmatic case, and large-scale change in its political economy was 
initiated by a series of governmental decisions to forsake dirigiste policies in favor of market-
oriented coordination, beginning in March 1983 (Hall 1987).  By virtue of the prominent role its 
state played in strategic coordination, France was peculiarly vulnerable to the disillusionment 
with state intervention that followed the economic crises of the 1970s and the institutional 
transformation of its political economy more profound than elsewhere in Europe.  As Culpepper 
(2006) has observed, however, once given a freer hand, French firms led the movement that was 
to transform corporate governance and industrial relations in the private sector.  Large firms took 
responsibility for devising new modes of inter-corporate coordination to replace those that had 
once been operated by the state (Hancké 2002).  Although the endpoint was more dramatic and 
the state the initiator, on close inspection, France displays processes of institutional change that 
correspond to the model presented here (Culpepper et al. 2006). 
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Conclusion 
The object of this article has been to elaborate the theory of institutional change we associate with 
a varieties-of-capitalism perspective on the political economy.  We have tried to show that an 
approach that understands institutions, at least in part, in equilibrium terms can accommodate an 
analysis of institutional change and that its broadly rationalist approach can comprehend many of 
the subtle features of such processes of change. We have emphasized that, even when institutions 
are Pareto-improving in the context of strategic interaction, their stability should not be taken for 
granted but rests on a highly-political process of mobilization marked by conflict and 
experimentation through which informational issues are resolved and distributional issues 
contested. 
 We have portrayed the political economy as an institutional ecology in which the 
strategies of the actors are simultaneously conditioned by multiple institutions, and the process of 
institutional change as one of mutual adjustment, inflected by distributive concerns, with 
incremental impacts on the strategies of firms and other actors.  The model we have proposed 
acknowledges more change than analyses focused entirely on regulatory regimes or public policy 
normally recognize.  Because we see firms as initiators of institutional change, virtually as 
important as the state, and highly responsive to shifts in the economic environment, we observe a 
widespread transformation of the European political economies that is only partly reflected in 
policy regimes.  Alongside familiar processes of reform, we see processes of defection and 
reinterpretation that are shifting institutional practices ‘from below’.  Related to this, our image of 
the political economy as an ecology of interacting institutions suggests that the process of change 
itself is likely to be incremental, based on mutual adjustment among the relevant actors, operating 
via small alterations to existing practices (Streeck and Thelen 2005).  In some respects, this is 
simply an extension of the processes of institutional experimentation that are a regular feature of 
political economies, though we have also stressed how incremental processes of this sort can 
result in major transformations over the medium and long run.  
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Beyond this, we have elaborated several ways of moving beyond the current fixation on 
the ‘liberalization’ of the European political economies, and suggested that the most promising 
way to extend the varieties of capitalism perspective is to devote more attention to the types of 
political coalitions that support the principal institutions of the political economy, with a view not 
only to elucidating them but to exploring how institutional arrangements in one sphere of the 
political economy condition perceptions of interest and the coalitions that form around 
institutional reform in other spheres.  That yields an account of institutional change that is 
eminently political. 
Moreover, we see institutional change as more than a matter of producer group politics.  
Although we have emphasized the interests that firms and workers have in particular modes of 
coordinating economic endeavors, we have also suggested that capacities for coordination depend 
on a sociological underlay, subsumed in many models under the rubric of ‘common knowledge’.  
Although summarized as a set of shared understandings about how other actors will behave under 
a variety of circumstances, this common knowledge extends to conceptions of social justice, 
about what one can reasonably expect from others, that are crucial to resolving the distributive 
conflicts that arise when actors try to coordinate with one another (Rothstein 2005, Streeck 1997, 
Goldthorpe 1978).  Such conceptions are features of the polity as a whole, and potentially the 
Achilles heel of the European political economies.    
If workers no longer believe that the industrial relations institutions or social regimes 
within which they labor will deliver a just set of rewards, a nation’s capacities for coordination 
may be threatened, even if its institutions remain intact.   Ultimately, a varieties-of-capitalism 
perspective draws attention to this dimension of institutions as well, and it is here that the most 
serious question marks hang over the European political economies.  In the face of a changing 
economy, as firms and governments decide how to reallocate work, benefits and leisure, and what 
to demand of those who receive them, the settled expectations of the post-war decades are being 
called into question.   These issues render developments in the realm of electoral politics salient 
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to the effectiveness of coordination in the political economy, and they too will have to figure in 
on-going analyses of institutional change. 
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Notes 
 
1 For relevant critiques see Howell 2003, Goodin 2003, Watson 2003, Blyth 2003 as well as those 
collected in Coates 2005 and Stato e Mercato 69 (December 2003). 
2  While analytically distinct, it is worth noting that the more formal and the more informal or 
conventional dimensions of institutions are often linked.  For example, the convention that large 
firms supply apprenticeship slots is supported, albeit at slight remove, by a number of more 
formal institutions – e.g., compulsory membership in employer chambers, strong unions pushing 
firms up-market, and relatively centralized wage bargaining institutions that compress wages and 
allow firms to earn rents on training.  
3 In a powerful analysis, Streeck (1991) has described this last feature as one that supplies 
‘redundant capacities’ to actors.  As he notes, some of these capacities are more available in some 
places and for some purposes than others. 
4 Bates (1988) and Knight (1992) have drawn attention to this problem. 
5 This is confirmed by studies that show a strong correlation between membership in employers 
associations and union presence in Germany 
6 Hoepner’s (2003) analysis of corporate reform in Germany provides a nice example.  
As he notes, it can be difficult to explain why German trade unions supported legislation 
requiring more transparent balance sheets.  Such moves could enhance the power of shareholders 
relative to stakeholders.  However, he found that the trade unions supported greater transparency 
because they believed it would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis firms, by supplying 
them with more information about the firm’s balance sheet.  Distributive concerns about what 
they could secure in the collective bargaining process, rather than concerns for the well-being of 
the economy as a whole, drove the position of the unions on this issue. 
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7   As Streeck (2004) notes, even institutional complementarities are often ‘discovered’ rather 
than designed, as actors work to adapt their strategies and the institutions around them to their 
purposes.   
8 Organized labor is another actor whose strategies, including those organized around maintaining 
coordination across a diverse membership, is obviously important. 
9  These are not exhaustive of the modes of change that can be observed in contemporary political 
economies, and a somewhat broader (though, again, not exhaustive) inventory is discussed in 
Streeck and Thelen (2005).  Defection is the mechanism that defines the mode of change that 
Streeck and Thelen call institutional “displacement,” and their mode of “conversion” features 
reinterpretation as the main mechanism of change (p. 31). 
10 We thank Terry Halliday for emphasizing this point to us. 
 
11  For a review of the co-evolution of the literatures on varieties of capitalism and cross-class 
alliances, see Thelen 2002. 
 
